

#### Cyber Security support to the HumanDrive Project 13<sup>th</sup> Dec 2018 SBD Automotive Ltd

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# HUMAN DRIVE





- 'Grand Drive' will be an end-to-end journey of around 200 miles including Motorway, A-Road and Country Road driving
- Using Machine Learning and AI to provide human-like control
- Research into human driving behaviour using physical vehicles and simulator
- Transport Systems Catapult and Horiba MIRA responsible for the Safety Work Package
- Cyber Security covered by a separate Work Package





















# SBD's Cyber Support Package

- Threat modelling for security requirements and design reviews
- Penetration testing
- Risk assessment (analysis of results, remediation and risk rating)



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- New product and technology tracking
- New standards and guidelines
- Competitor activity
- Knowledge sharing




Intelligence

- Objective setting
- Design process improvement
- Cyber roadmap
- Incident response planning
- Training
- Supplier evaluation





### SAE Definitions





### Implementation Trends

	SAE Levels	Key in-car architecture charac
	<b>Level 0</b> "Legacy architecture"	<ul> <li>Piece meal implementation</li> <li>Very few ADAS available, developed</li> <li>No sensor fusion (sensor hardwired</li> <li>Mainly CAN technology</li> </ul>
	<b>Level 1</b> "Carry-over architecture"	<ul> <li>Piece meal implementation</li> <li>A few stand-alone ADAS</li> <li>When there is actuation (e.g. brakin</li> <li>Mainly CAN technology</li> </ul>
	<b>Level 2</b> "Primitive ADAS architecture"	<ul> <li>Dedicated ADAS network</li> <li>Primitive / localised sensor fusion ta</li> <li>FlexRay technology introduced</li> <li>Ethernet used for 360 all round view</li> <li>Some features communicate with k</li> </ul>
	<b>Level 3</b> "Semi autonomous architecture"	<ul> <li>Dedicated ADAS domain to support</li> <li>Sensor fusion partitioned in domain</li> <li>GPS / map data becomes a sensor th</li> <li>Communication with key fob / smart</li> <li>FlexRay and Ethernet standard</li> </ul>
	<b>Level 4</b> "Full autonomous architecture"	<ul> <li>Dedicated ADAS domain to support</li> <li>GPS / map data need near "real-time</li> <li>Communicate with key fob / smart</li> <li>OTA download and connected servi</li> <li>FlexRay and Ethernet standard</li> </ul>
	Level 5 "Driverless architecture"	<ul> <li>Same as for level 4 but with more se</li> </ul>

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#### cteristics

d as a stand alone solution d to ECU, not networked) and no actuators involved

#### ing), the ADAS ECU is usually on the same network as the actuator

taking place (front sensing with rear facing). Some sensors are networked

#### key fob / smartphone

rt sensor fusion on a much larger scale ns that needs **regular update** artphone


t full sensor fusion (Forward, Rear, All Around) ne" update & high definition tphone vices (including Artificial intelligence)

sensors to accommodate all types of road, weather and lighting environment.






## Layer 3 and above layers architecture







#### **Representative Electrical Architecture**







## STRIDE


STRIDE (Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, Information Disclosure, Denial of Service and Elevation of Privilege) is a threat modelling approach developed by Microsoft and it is currently considered the most applicable method for the automotive industry because it:

- Is a threat centric approach
- Provides a structured approach of categorising threats
- Enables direct mapping with system's elements and security attributes

Unauthorised modification of data


User with limited privileges gains access to restricted application

User with limited privileges gains access to restricted application






## Threat Modelling






# Reference: Who are the Hackers?

different.



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
Depending on hackers/hacker groups, targets can be different. Therefore attacking techniques and equipment are also







#### Defining the Actors Environment








#### **Representative Abuse Stories**

- User stories is a method for  $\bullet$ capturing high-level system functional requirements. The user stories are generated by the system stakeholders.
- stories captured User for ulletmalicious Actors can help in identifying potential system misuse or exploitation, at a high level.
- User stories written for intended  $\bullet$ Actors can help in identifying the functions that need protecting and the required interactions between the intended Actors.

Case #	Actor	I Want	So That
1	Bitcoin Miner	Use ability of ECUs	Get more bitcoin
2	Academic Researcher/Cyber Criminal	Spoof the system	Get private information from vehicle
3	Service Provider	Patch the vehicle but ignore some of	Have this customer back and get more
		them	money
4	Vehicle Owner	Block the entrance parking	Annoy my neighbours
5	Vehicle Owner	Cheat after cars into giving ways	He can drive faster
6	Professional Hacker	Hack into the car	Ransom it to their owners
7	Competitor	Cause delays(jam) in some roads	Gain advantage/value
8	Criminal	Follow another vehicle	Do criminal activities
9	Criminal	Other CAV crash into my own	Get money
10	Criminal	Use Autonomous Car	Transport illicit goods
11	Terrorist	Use Autonomous Car	Damage traffic
12	Professional Hacker	Spoof signs	Change vehicle behaviour
13	OCA (Organise Crime Agent)	Data mining - sell products on web	Can get profit
14	OEM	Gather data to sell	Get money
15	Competitor	Develop new exciting products	Seize the market
16	Pranker	Direct traffic	Make giggles
17	OEM	Highlight deficiencies in system	Gan greater market sharing
18	Attacker/Terrorist	Remotely control cars	Commit a terrorist attack
19	Professional Hacker	Control the vehicle	Do the DDoS attack to others



### Defence In Depth




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# Defence in Depth

1. Off-board interfaces	• Remoto • Custon
2. On-board interfaces	• Wireles • Wired
3. Inter-network	• Secure • Messag
4. Intra-network	• ECU-E( • Sensor
5. ECU level	• Secure • Secure







#### HumanDrive Consortium



HITACHI **Inspire the Next** 





**ATKINS** 

http://humandrive.co.uk

#### Using machine learning to develop natural, human like vehicle control







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